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Let’s suppose that you can conceive of a scenario that seems to involve a bar of 
iron floating in water. Should you conclude, on that basis, that iron could float in 
water? Someone might not be so sure. Consider these details: 
Changing the properties of a bar of iron so as to make it float 
requires changing its gravitational properties, which in turn 
requires changing its specific density, which in turn requires 
changing either the size of its unit cells or the number and kinds of 
atoms within them. Changing the number and kinds of atoms 
requires changing a feature that seems to be constitutive of being 
iron. (Iron just is the chemical element with atomic number 26.) 
Likewise, changing the size of its unit cells results in a change in 
the features determined by the lattice structure of those cells 
(cleavage, crystal habit, optical properties, etc.). Iron is a transition 
metal, lying between manganese and cobalt on the Periodic Table. 
Thus, the range of possible densities for iron is highly restricted by 
these neighboring transition elements. But such leeway for changes 
in density isn’t anywhere near what’s required to make iron float. 
So either way, changing the properties of iron so as to make it float 
appears to result in something that isn’t iron. 
 
Of course, these details don’t show that the scenario is impossible. There might 
well be considerations overlooked in the sketch above. Still, they do seem to 
constitute a serious defeater for the inference from conceivability to possibility—
or, for that matter, from imaginability to possibility—at least where (a) we have 
reason to think that such details are relevant to whether the possibility claim is 
true and (b) we have no reason to think that these details can be worked out in a 
way that’s compatible with the truth of the possibility claim. But then we have a 
serious defeater for many inferences from conceivability to possibility, since there 
are often going to be complex physical, chemical, and biological facts that are 
relevant to whether a possibility claim is true, and we often have nothing more 
than our conceiving to offer in defense of the compatibility. (A natural reply is to 
insist that the laws could be different, and so it’s trivial to satisfy Condition (b). 
But it’s worth asking why we’re justified in believing that the laws could be 
different. If the answer is that it’s conceivable that they be different, then 
concerns just outlined can be repeated here. Perhaps it isn’t so easy to change the 
relevant laws—there are, after all, various complex relations between them. And 
if it’s conceivable that all the laws are different, then we have to consider why we 
think it’s possible that the entities in question could survive a transition to a world 
with radically different laws.) Of course, none of this is news: George Seddon 
(1972) made these sorts of points over forty years ago, and Peter van Inwagen has 
reiterated them many times (1977, 1979, 1991, 1997, 1998, 2008). 
 Still, plenty of philosophers ignore them. Granted, no one ignores them the 
way they did in the 1970s. Philosophy contains fewer people-seedsi and 
teletransportersii than it once did, but openness to such modalizing remains. 
Consider, for example, just about any of the standard skeptical scenarios—we’re 
deceived by an evil demon, we’re all brains in vats, etc. These scenarios are 
worthless if they aren’t possible, and we take them to be possible on nothing more 
than their conceivability. Surely, though, (a) we have reason to think that various 
details are relevant to whether the possibility claim is true and (b) we have no 
particular reason to think that these details can be worked out in a way that’s 
compatible with the truth of the possibility claim. Or consider David Lewis’s 
sorcerer:  
A sorcerer takes a liking to a fragile glass, one that is a perfect 
intrinsic duplicate of all the other fragile glasses off the same 
production line. He does nothing at all to change the dispositional 
character of his glass. He only watches and waits, resolved that if 
ever his glass is struck, then, quick as a flash, he will cast a spell 
that changes the glass, renders it no longer fragile, and thereby 
aborts the process of breaking. So his finkishly fragile glass would 
not break if struck—but no thanks to any protective disposition of 
the glass itself. Thanks, instead, to a disposition of the sorcerer 
(Lewis, 1997, p. 147). 
 
The puzzle that Lewis tries to solve isn’t a genuine one unless such cases are 
possible. And why think they are? Presumably, because the scenario is 
conceivable. And again: our two conditions apply. 
 Finally, consider express attempts to avoid conceivability’s troubles—
such as Joshua Rasmussen’s (2013) discussion of principles of modal continuity. 
Very roughly, his view is that you’re justified in believing that p is possible if (a) 
you’re justified in believing that q is possible and (b) the difference between q and 
p is somehow quantitative—e.g., q concerns the possibility of a certain object 
weighing ten pounds, and p concerns the possibility of that object weighing 
eleven. This sounds plausible enough, but it ignores the challenge above: there 
may well be structural reasons why the object could only weigh ten pounds, or 
less than ten but never more, or whatever. (Perhaps its frame couldn’t support 
more than that, so it would be crushed were it at all heavier.) Unless we have 
some reason to think—of the particular object in question—that the relevant 
details can be worked out in a way that’s compatible with the truth of the 
possibility claim, it’s hard to see what a principle of modal continuity offers us. 
 What will it take to reign in our modalizing? We suspect that the challenge 
here is dialectical. We’re all operating in a philosophical climate that allows you 
to dismiss skeptical challenges precisely because they lead to skepticism. So it’s 
no good to press skeptical challenges against those who defend particular modal 
claims, or general principles that are supposed to sanction modal claims. Better to 
run an argument that leads them to develop a skeptical reply, and then to point out 
that reply’s implications. That’s our aim here. We offer a dilemma: either you can 
conceive of a modal-knowno, or you can’t. If you can, then modal skepticism 
follows. If you can’t, then the reason why will lead you to accept the same 
epistemic caution that Seddon and van Inwagen recommend. 
The Dilemma 
Our argument extends a criticism that Peter van Inwagen makes against the modal 
ontological argument. The crucial premise of that argument is that there could be 
a perfect being, where a being is perfect only if it exists necessarily. Against this 
premise, van Inwagen writes: 
. . . there can be no presumption in favor of possibility . . . To see 
that this is a fact, consider the concept of a “knowno”: the concept 
of a being who knows that there is no perfect being. There would 
seem to be no reason, on the face of it, to suppose that there being 
a knowno is an intrinsically impossible state of affairs, like there 
being a liquid wine bottle. But consider. If a knowno is not 
intrinsically impossible, there is a knowno in some possible world. 
But then there is a possible world in which there is no perfect 
being, since, if someone knows something, then what that person 
knows is true . . . It follows that if a knowno is possible, a perfect 
being is impossible – and that if a perfect being is possible, a 
knowno is impossible . . . We have, therefore, a pair of concepts – 
the concept of a perfect being and the concept of a knowno – such 
that either one of them is possible only if the other is impossible. 
And we have no argument for the impossibility of either concept. 
If we adopted the general rule “A concept is to be assumed to be 
possible in the absence of an argument for its impossibility”, we 
should have to assume both these concepts to be possible, and we 
know that it is false that they are both possible (Van Inwagen, 
2008, pp. 207-208). 
 
We aren’t interested in whether a knowno is in fact possible. Nor are we 
interested in the specific point that van Inwagen is making here. In this passage, 
his point is that we can’t simply assume that propositions are possible, since for 
any proposition you like, you can identify one with which it’s incompatible. True 
enough, but not terribly interesting. 
 What’s more interesting is to consider whether you can conceive of a 
knowno. Let’s suppose you can. If so, then you can also conceive of a modal-
knowno—i.e., a being who knows, of some proposition p, that p is impossible. 
Now suppose it’s conceivable that p—the very p that the modal-knowno knows to 
be impossible. If p is possible, then there can’t be such a being; likewise, if there 
could be such a being, then p is impossible. Plainly, you can’t be justified in 
believing that both are possible, and that means that you can’t be justified in 
believing that either is possible. Moreover, this is true for any value of p. So, we 
now have a general argument against conceiving as a guide to possibility: the 
conceivability of modal-knownos provides an undercutting defeater for every 
inference from conceivability to possibility, which means that conceivability is an 
unreliable guide to possibility. It isn’t just that the presumption of possibility goes 
by the board, across the board, as in van Inwagen’s original argument. Rather, it’s 
that we have to change our default stance concerning the reliability of this mental 
operation. Instead of being allowed to assume that it’s innocent until proven 
guilty, we ought to assume the converse. Call this the modal-knowno problem.iii 
 Now: either we face the modal-knowno problem, or we don’t. If we do, 
then we need to offer positive arguments for possibility claims; that they’re 
conceivable isn’t sufficient. So suppose we don’t face the modal-knowno 
problem. Presumably, this is because (a) there’s a special problem with the 
inference from the conceivability of the modal-knowno to the possibility thereof 
or (b) we aren’t justified in believing that we’ve conceived of a modal-knowno. 
We have no idea what the former could be, so we ignore it. But it’s easy to see 
why someone might press the latter point. 
 After all, someone might insist that you can’t be confident that you’ve 
conceived of a modal-knowno unless you’re already confident that whatever that 
being believes to be impossible is impossible. In other words, despite the apparent 
conceivability of some particular modal-knowno, you should doubt that your 
conceiving has been successful unless you are reasonably confident that the 
conditions obtain that make that modal-knowno possible. If you aren’t so 
confident, then there remains a relevant possibility that you’ve failed to 
eliminate—namely, that the modal-knowno merely believes that the claim is false, 
and is mistaken about this. 
An Objection and a Reply 
The point here is reminiscent of the traditional problem of skepticism regarding 
our beliefs about the external world. You can put the problem in terms of the 
inability to rule out alternatives: you don’t know if your experiences are of your 
hands, since that would require that your evidence is sufficient to rule out 
alternatives to your belief that you have hands. But your evidence is qualitatively 
identical to the evidence you would have if, say, you were a brain in a vat hooked 
up to a computer that caused hand-experiences within you. So, you’re not justified 
in believing that you have hands. 
 However, you might reply that you don’t need to rule out all alternatives 
in order to have perceptual justification. Rather, you need only rule out all 
relevant alternatives—i.e., all alternatives that are live possibilities for the context 
in question, given your background evidence. So, for example, while at the zoo, 
you can know that you see a zebra, and not a mule painted to look like a zebra, 
since your background evidence doesn’t make it likely that there are painted 
mules in the zoo.iv With respect to the modal-knowno, then, we need something 
similar: we need our background evidence to rule out the live (epistemic) 
possibility that a given proposition is (metaphysically) possible, even though the 
modal-knowno thinks otherwise.  
 What sort of evidence should that be? Well, suppose that you can conceive 
of a group of scientists standing around a computer and shouting, “It’s a 
counterexample to Goldbach’s Conjecture!” That wouldn’t offer even prima facie 
justification for the claim that Goldbach’s Conjecture could be false, for the 
thought experiment is equally supportive of, for example, the alternative that 
there’s a glitch in the computer program that caused it to derive the mistaken 
conclusion that Goldbach’s Conjecture is false. No: you need to imagine the 
counterexample itself, or at least something that raises the probability that there is 
a counterexample.v (The case imagined doesn’t, and this not least because you can 
equally well imagine a group of dejected scientists lamenting their inability to 
find such a counterexample. If the former case raises the possibility of there being 
a conjecture, then this one lowers it. So neither does either.) Anything less leads 
us back to the modal-knowno problem: if you can get evidence for a 
counterexample to Goldbach’s Conjecture by conceiving of elated scientists, then 
you can get evidence for the possibility of a modal-knowno. That way lies defeat. 
 So: if you’re justified in taking yourself to have conceived of a modal-
knowno, then you can rule out the possibility that you are conceiving of a being 
who believes falsely that p is impossible. But if that’s right, then the same should 
be true for other extraordinary modal claims That is, it should be true generally 
that you need to rule out all the live possibilities that are compatible with your 
conceiving before your conceiving is evidence. It looks like the bar is high 
indeed. 
 Let’s take stock. Either we face the modal-knowno problem, or we don’t. 
If we do, then we have reason to think that conceiving is an unreliable guide to 
possibility, and we need to offer other positive arguments for possibility claims. 
We doubt that anyone will take this horn of the dilemma. So suppose we don’t 
face the modal-knowno problem. If not, then this is probably because we aren’t 
justified in thinking that we’ve conceived of a modal-knowno. And if that’s so, 
it’s probably because we can’t rule out the possibility that we are conceiving of a 
being who believes falsely that p is impossible. However, there is no reason to 
think that the modal-knowno case is special: if eliminating possibilities is the 
standard for conceiving in this case, it should be the standard across the board. So, 
it’s generally the case that being able to eliminate possibilities is the standard for 
conceiving. 
 But that conclusion, of course, is exactly what motivates Seddon and van 
Inwagen to insist that people consider the details behind particular modal claims. 
In many cases, we have no reason to think that there is a set of compossible 
properties that could undergird a particular individual or kind of individual 
referred to in the relevant thought experiment. This forces us to consider a 
relevant possibility: that we are not conceiving of whatever it is of which we take 
ourselves to be conceiving. Van Inwagen gives a large number of cases in support 
this claim: cases involving claims about the possibility of transparent ironvi, a 
human being drinking lots of alcohol (relative to one’s height and weight) without 
it affecting their sobrietyvii, a moon made out of cheeseviii, science-fiction brain-
state-transfer cases of various sorts discussed in the personal identity literatureix, 
and naturally purple cowsx. 
Conclusion 
The result here isn’t complete modal skepticism. Rather, it’s a choice. Insofar as 
we take all our modal knowledge to come by way of certain mental operations—
conceiving, imagining, etc.—then we should be moderate modal skeptics unless, 
for particular modal claims, we can tell reasonably detailed stories about their 
truthmakers. That is, we should think that we usually aren’t justified in believing 
modal claims, though there may be a few exceptions where we have reasonably 
good accounts of why they’re true. (What’s reasonable is likely to depend on the 
context, but it’s bound to be something more detailed than a mere description of 
the scene.) Alternately, we might not take all our modal knowledge to come by 
way of certain mental operations. You might be a Moorean about some modal 
claims—as van Inwagen himself seems to be—and hold the rest to the standards 
discussed here. Alternately, you might think that inductive reasoning underwrites 
some of our modal justification, though it will be tricky to tell when inductive 
arguments are legitimate. Perhaps the only secure ones will be those where we 
can often confirm the inference by actualizing the relevant possibility. So, e.g., 
you can be justified in believing that the furniture could be reconfigured because 
you’ve reconfigured the furniture before, and in those cases your earlier and 
analogous inferences were confirmed. 
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